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Abstract: The use of fencing at railway stations to reduce the numbers of fatalities is a common 
safety intervention. This study examines the effectiveness of a mid-platform fencing programme 
as a means of preventing access to the track area.  Two aspects of the programme are 
considered: firstly the extent to which fencing has been fitted to provide a secure barrier to fast 
lines at the target stations; and secondly, investigation of incidents in which the physical barrier 
has been overcome by individuals.  The study involved the analysis and collation of descriptive 
data, using station visits, interviews with industry staff, examination of reports on the incidents 
and data from the SMIS database. It was found that the desired level of restriction of access to 
the intended areas through fencing was not always provided. So far, there have been few 
examples where somebody attempted or succeeded in climbing over a barrier to access the 
track.  Factors affecting the effectiveness of physical barriers are presented and some 
shortcomings in current collection of evidence through incident reporting are highlighted.   
 





Fencing is used in many locations to prevent access to the railway, with examples at platform 
ends or along the perimeter of the railway.  In Great Britain, analysis within the industry 
identified that there was a disproportionate number of incidents on fast lines, often at island 
platforms, at stations where trains do not typically stop.  Several programmes of work have taken 
place in the last ten years to fit mid-platform fencing, an example of which is shown in Figure 1.  
This fencing allows passengers to access the slow line of the island platform, but prevents access 
to the fast line platform.  The fencing is fitted with gates, as shown in Figure 2, in order to enable 
people to get access to and from the fast line platform in various circumstances (e.g. in times of 
disruption where there are unusual stopping patterns).  The gates are usually locked during the 
daytime when the station may be staffed, but unlocked to allow access for legitimate purposes at 
night time.  In order for the fencing to provide an effective barrier to access it needs to be fitted to 
a suitable standard and be complete (e.g. securing against access along the length of the platform 
and joining with existing or newly fitted platform end fencing).  There are commonly two fast 
lines at stations (running in opposite directions) and fencing programmes also need to include 
works to fit new fencing and secure existing access points to other fast line platforms where 
trains do not routinely stop (e.g. at gates at alternative entrances to stations).     
  
Figures 1 and 2.  Mid-platform fencing, separating a fast line platform from the slow line 
platform and a sliding gate in the mid-platform fencing 
 
The use of a fencing approach is founded on good theory, employing the principle of restricting 
the access to the lethal means to lower the rates of suicide (Mann et al., 2005).  There is evidence 
in the literature of the beneficial effect of platform screen doors at stations (Law et al, 2009).  
However, there have been no previous studies of the effectiveness of the use of mid-platform 
fencing as a safety intervention in this type of context.    This study collects descriptive evidence 
as a means of evaluating the implementation and effectiveness of this type of fencing programme.  
This work is consistent with a theory based approach (Hills and Junge, 2010) to understand 
whether the intervention has worked, why it has worked and under what circumstances it has 
worked.  Two main questions are considered.  Firstly, the level of restriction of access to the 
main line at a sample stations is described, considering variations in the type, implementation and 
maintenance of the barriers at different locations. Secondly, records of the incidents that have 
occurred at the stations in the sample are analysed, building on the approach to qualitative 
analysis of incidents in Ryan (in press), focusing on the point of access to the track and 




2.1 The collection and analysis of site specific details. 
Forty nine stations along three rail routes in Great Britain have been considered in this study. 
Preliminary data on the types of fencing that were implemented at these stations have been 
collected during station visits conducted as part of the RESTRAIL project (www.restrail.eu) in 
2013-14. On completion of that project in 2014 the fencing programme at some locations was 
still in progress.  For the purpose of the current study, follow up visits have been conducted in 
2017 at fifteen of the stations in the sample, to investigate the current status of the fencing and 
collect additional evidence about any incidents that have occurred at the stations in the 
intervening time period. During the visits notes and photographic evidence were collected on the 
type of the restriction, verifying the position of barriers in relation to fast line locations on plans 
of the stations. Staffing arrangements of the station were observed. 
Semi-structured interviews were used with staff to discuss their perceptions of the restriction of 
access through fencing. Thirteen participants were recruited, including station staff, station and 
area managers and members of British Transport Police.    All were familiar with site-specific 
circumstances as a result of working at a location, managing or patrolling locations as a part of 
their work duties. Information collected during these interviews included site specific details of 
the types of the barriers and the dates when they were implemented, staffing levels, manned 
hours of the station and details of incidents since the fitting of the fencing.   
The findings from the station visits and interviews were collated with information that had been 
compiled in the earlier work in 2014.  Each station was described using three criteria: the 
protection of the Up Main line, protection of the Down Main line and adequate implementation 
and maintenance of the barrier. Descriptions of these characteristics and their values are 
included in Table 1.  Tale 2 shows how different combinations of circumstances at stations can 
be interpreted, in terms of the level of protection that is provided at the station (i.e. full or partial 
restriction of access).   
 
Table 1 Criteria describing the protection of the Up/Down Main line at stations and the 
implementation and maintenance of the barrier. 
(1)Protection of the Up Main line as well as (2) Protection of the Down Main line could take 
one of three following values: 
full protection There is either mid-platform fencing or fencing running along the full length 
of the platform or other barrier which fully separates the areas from main line 
track from the rest of the station. 
partial 
protection 
Presence of a barrier on the platform, however there are gaps in the fencing, 
thus it is not continuous along the full length of the platform (e.g. due to 
incomplete fencing). 
no protection Within the station environment areas adjacent to the main line can easily be 
accessed by the members of the public as there is no barrier in place or the 
barrier protects only short sections of the platform (e.g. at the platform ends). 
(3)Adequate implementation and maintenance of the barrier could take one of three values: 
yes There were no circumstances that could undermine the effectiveness of the 
implemented barrier 
no Circumstances that could undermine the effectiveness of the implemented 
barrier were identified at the location (not connected with the standard 
operation of the gates e.g. leaving the gates unlocked when the station was 
unmanned) 
n/a In case both characteristics protection of the Up Main line and  protection of 
the Down Main line had value no protection 
 
Table 2 Criteria used to describe the level of restriction of access at stations. 
 Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4 Case 5 
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Each station was assigned to only one group (full, partial, little / no restriction).  Where possible, 
the date when the fencing restriction was completed at the station was recorded.  In some cases it 
was possible to establish only an approximate date when the measure was implemented. 
 
2.2 The collection and analysis of incident-related data. 
The second part of this study involved the review of fatalities that had occurred at the sample of 
stations in the time since the fitting of the fencing (in this study using data from the industry 
database SMIS for the period from 1/01/2010 to 01/02/2017).  By classifying the stations in this 
way it was possible to identify the incidents at stations where a full or partial restriction to the 
main line was provided at the time of the incident. As the barriers are intended to protect the main 
lines, only incidents where the point of impact occurred on the main line were included within the 
scope of the study. 
The following details from incidents were extracted from data fields and narrative fields in the 
database and recorded in a table: the location; date and time of the incident; the line where the 
fatality occurred; actions of the person preceding the incident; the point of impact with the train.  
Information about the circumstances of the suicidal act were supplemented with details from 
incident related reports provided by the BTP and Network Rail, including: BTP Post Incident 
Site Report (ISR) (available for 14 incidents), BTP Incident External Report (ER) (available for 
4 incidents), Network Rail Fatality Follow Up Inspection Report (FFI) (available for 1 incident) 
and Suicide Event Station Review Form (SRF) (1 incident). These sources provided information 
on the point of access to the track, the actions of the person prior to the incident as well as detail 
on the suicide prevention measures present at the station at the time of the incident. At least one 
additional data source was therefore available for most of the incidents. No additional reports 
were available for one incident and one other case was included within the scope after the 




3.1 The level of restriction of access to the main line at stations. 
Table 3 provides a description of four groups which were identified within the sample, together 
with the types of measures within each group.  
 Table 3 Groups of stations recognised within the study sample, classified by the level of access to 
the main lines. 
Level of restriction of 
access 
(number of stations 
allocated to the group) 
Type of barriers protecting the up/down main line at the 
stations 
Full restriction (21) Full mid-platform fencing, full fencing, gate/doors 
Partial restriction (16)  Full mid-platform fencing, partial mid-platform fencing (with gaps), 
full fence (minor gaps), full fence (minor gaps) and gate/doors, 
distance 
Little or no restriction 
(10) 
No barriers, partial fencing (fence only at short sections along the 
platform) 
Initially Partial 
restriction, upgraded to 
Full restriction (2) 
Partial mid-platform fencing, supplemented with further fencing 
several years later and therefore re-classified as full mid-platform 
fencing 
 
There are some circumstances where full fencing or full mid-platform fencing has been classified 
within the partial restriction group, as a result of information that has been collected during this 
study. In the eight cases that are described in Table 4 there were problems with the 
implementation of the fencing or the control of access to protected locations. 
 
Table 4. Findings on the site-specific aspects which affected the performance of the fitted barrier.   
Type of the barrier 
(number of locations 
[location codes]) 
Implementation and maintenance of the barrier 
Full mid-platform fencing 
(4 locations  
[1.h, 2.l, 2.r, 3.c]) 
Low staffing levels (station staffed 4h/day Mon-Fri) wouldn’t allow 
for an appropriate closure of the gates in mid-platform fencing. It is 
evident that the gates can be left open by passengers getting on or 
off the train at the restricted access platform at this location and 
these could stay open for long hours, undermining the impact of the 
fencing as a physical barrier (case 1.h). 
Quality of the implemented fencing does not ensure that the 
restricted platform areas will not be accessed. The area can be 
accessed over the waist-high key clamp fence, the gates in the 
fencing were not robust enough and many of them do not close any 
more (station 2.l). 
Quality of the implemented fencing. There is a problem with the 
passenger flow at the location. Passengers need to go through the 
restricted access platform on a daily basis on their way to and from 
 3.2 Examples of the incidents when the barrier has been overcome. 
Nineteen incidents occurred within the sample of stations in the period after fitting of the fencing.   
More than half of the incidents took place at two hotspot locations (1.b. (8 incidents) and 1.n. (2 
incidents)). Nine other incidents occurred at 9 individual locations.  Nearly three quarters of the 
incidents in the sample occurred at the stations provided with partial restrictions.  There were also 
events which occurred at locations where the protection of the main line at the time of the 
incident was classified as full protection.  
In a majority of cases (13 incidents) the recorded data enabled identification of the point of 
access as the restricted access platform (or area). In four further cases it was indicated that the 
access occurred from a platform, but it was not stated whether it was from a restricted platform or 
another platform. Contradicting information was provided from different sources on the point of 
access for two incidents. 
It was possible to obtain unambiguous information on how the barrier had been overcome in a 
limited number of these cases (4 cases). Examples of descriptions of access include a person 
going through a gap in the barrier at a station with partial restriction of access, passing through 
the gates in mid-platform fencing where there was full restriction (though it was not indicated 
whether the gates were open or closed at the time), taking advantage of a situation where the 
barrier was not secured during the engineering works, or making use of a poorly located element 
of the station furniture to climb over the fence. 
Table 5 presents a summary of recorded details for six locations where the incidents took place. 
Information is presented for two locations where partial restrictions of access have been 
provided, two locations where full restrictions to access were fitted and two locations where the 
initial partial restrictions were upgraded to a fully protected line.   
 
  
one of the station entrances, so the gates are kept open. According 
to the interview participant this is a result of poor planning at the 
implementation stage (Interview P10) (station 2.r). 
Control of the access to the restricted area is not sufficient as the 
platform can be accessed from the underpass via a lift, which is 
operational at all times. A BTP report also indicates a problem with 
the gates being left open (IRS). Interview respondents suggested 
that at this station, this can be because a staff office is located on 
the restricted access platform and station staff go through the gates 
on a regular basis (case 3.c). 
Full fence (minor gaps) 
(4  locations  
[2.b, 2.d, 2.f, 2.g]) 
Quality of the implemented fencing. Access to the main lines can be 
obtained through gaps in the timber fence located underneath 
footbridges (all four cases) 
Table 5. Selected incidents when a person accessed the main line via the restricted access 
platform. 
Location code/Year/ 
Restriction of access to 
the Main Line at the time 
of the incident 




Partial - Main lines 
separated from the station 
by distance but no 
physical barrier present. 
 
Platform (restricted access 
platform or other) (SMIS) 




Note: "Site type description: 
Running line"(SMIS) 
The detail from the SMIS narrative field 
informs that the track was accessed from the 
platform. This information could have been 
missed in less precise analysis, as the 
standard field of SMIS provided information 
about the “running line” location of the 
incident. An imprecise indication of the 
platform (lack of platform number) does not 
help in retracing the path taken by a person 
involved.  It is likely that the person crossed 
the distance between the platform and the 
main line where the impact occurred.  
2.r./2015 
Partial - MPF Running 
along the full length of 
the platform but issues 
with passenger 
movements (passengers 
access restricted area on a 
daily basis and the gates 
are being left open). 
Platform (restricted access 
platform or other) (ER, SMIS) 
e.g. "Access Point: Main 
Platform" (ER) 
Limited information on the point of access to 
the track is recorded. The person involved 
may have accessed the main line platform 
through the gates, as is common for other 
passengers.  
1.e./2014 
Full - MPF running along 
the full length of the 
platform. 
Note: "The Fatality 
Fencing gates were closed 
when this incident 
occurred. There is no 
access from the station 
entrance to the up main 
platform" (SRF) 
 
Restricted access platform 
(SMIS Narrative, ISR, SRF, 
Interview) e.g. "Incident 
location: from Platform 2" 
 
Additional information: 
Person climbed over the 
fencing using a sand box 
leaning against the fencing and 
accessed the closed-off area 
(SRF, Interview P4) e.g. "The 
person (...) climbed over a 
sand box to the Up Main 
middle Platform..." (SRF) 
Records describe how, to overcome a full 
mid-platform fencing running along the entire 
length of the platform, the individual 
involved climbed the sand box leaning 
against the fence. The record stressed that the 
gates remained closed. 
1.p./2016 
Full - MPF running along 
the full length of the 
platform. 
Restricted access platform 
(SMIS Narrative, ISR) e.g. 
"Deceased entered upon 
station, accessed gated area of 
platform 2 and jumped from 
platform" 
The individual waited at the station and next 
accessed the main line by going through one 
of the gates in the mid-platform fencing. The 
record does not specify whether the gate was 
opened or in a closed position. 
Location code/Year/ 
Restriction of access to 
the Main Line at the time 
of the incident 
Point of access to the track 
(source) 
Commentary 
1.n./ Two incidents in 
2015 
Partial - MPF fitted on the 
island platform, 
restricting access to the up 
main line. Unrestricted 
access to Platform 1 
adjacent to the down main 
line from the station road. 
 
Note: “There is a gate on 
platform 1 that gives 
simple access to the 
railway. This is not closed 
as it allows those wishing 
access to the lift to do 
so.”(ISR) 
Platform (restricted access or 
other) (in both cases ) (SMIS 
Narrative, ER) 
e.g. ''…was seen to jump from 
the platform into the four foot 




Two incidents occurred on the main lines at 
station 1.n. in 2015. Due to imprecise 
indication of the point of access (missing 
platform number) it cannot be stated whether 
a person involved climbed over the MPF 
protecting the up main line. As both incidents 
occurred on the down main line, it is more 
likely that the line was accessed from the 
adjacent platform 1. This platform had no 
barrier provided and the line could have been 
accessed from the station road.  After the 
incidents, in 2016, the access to this platform 
was limited by closing a gate and fitting a 
fence which prevented access to the platform 
from the station road. No more incidents 
occurred on the main line at this location 
within the period of the study. 
1.b./ Four incidents in 
2014 
Three incidents in 2015 
Partial - MPF fitted on a 
part of the platform 
length, but leaving access 
at the bottom of the stairs. 
 
Note: "The planned 
additional mid-platform 
fencing and concertina 
gate mentioned above 
should be installed as a 
matter of urgency" (ISR 
2015) 
Restricted access platform 
(SMIS Narrative, ISR) 
In each of the four cases in 
2014 and in one case in 2015 
the exact platform from which 
the person accessed the line 
was indicated as platform 2 
(adjacent to the main lines) 
e.g."Incident location: From 
platform 2" (ISR) 
In two other cases which took 
place in 2015 the record only  
indicated that the line was 
accessed from the platform 




In one case a person involved 
crossed the up main line and 
accessed the down main line 
where the impact occurred 
"Deceased jumped from 
Platform 2 which is the up fast 
line, ran across the up fast and 
jumped in front of a non-
stopping down fast 
Four incidents occurred in 2014 and three 
further in 2015 took place at station 1b.  It is 
striking how in each of these incidents, the 
person involved accessed the line in a similar 
way, by accessing the main lines through the 
gap in the fencing (located close to the 
entrance to the platform). It is recorded how 
the person involved in one of the incidents 
ran across one of the main lines (up main) to 
access the line where the person was struck 
(down main).  
In early 2016 the gaps were filled with 
fencing and a section of retractable fence. 
(Retractable fencing was used because issues 
with the crowding prevented fitting a full 
fence to be fitted at the location.) After this, 
the level of protection of the fast line at the 
station was classified as “full”. No incidents 
occurred in 2016 at the main lines at the 
location.  
 
There was one incident in 2017. The records 
suggest that the platform serving the main 
line was not secured at the time due to the 
engineering works. This is not clearly 
indicated in the written report.  Knowing that 
Location code/Year/ 
Restriction of access to 
the Main Line at the time 
of the incident 






the incident occurred during the weekend 
gives an indication that the gate was not 
closed at the time. Information from the 
interview confirmed this account. 
1.b./2017 
Full - MPF fitted on a part 
of the platform length, 
gaps in between buildings 
filled with fencing and 
retractable fencing. 
Restricted access platform 
(SMIS Narrative, ISR) e.g. 
Confirmed point of access, if 
known: Platform 1" (ISR), " 




"a secure gate to platform 1 
which is closed Monday to 
Friday and only used at 
weekends, if works take place 
on platforms 3 and 4." (ISR) 
"... we had one at 1b. on the 
main line, in fact when the 
station was operating on the 
main lines"(a response at 
interview when asked about 
the incidents after the barrier 
was fitted at the station) 
(Interview P2)  
 
4. Discussion and Conclusion 
 
The analysis of descriptive data on the circumstances of suicides at the locations and the new 
classification of the level of restriction of access to the locations was essential in starting to 
evaluate the effectiveness of mid-platform fencing as a suicide prevention measure. There are 
many indications of success of the fencing as a prevention measure, where the fencing has been 
fitted as part of a well planned and executed programme of work and to date there have been no 
recent suicide events at these locations.  Two of the examples from the current study showed that 
the level of restriction at the location has improved over time.  At present, there have been no 
further incidents at these locations, but it is too early to state whether there has been a positive 
effect of the new fencing intervention.  There are also examples, however, where the fencing 
does not appear to have been as effective as a prevention measure.  
This study showed that fitting of a certain type of the barrier at a location does not guarantee the 
desired level of restriction of access to fast lines at a station. In order to understand the level of 
restriction, it is important to know much more about the fencing and how it operates at a 
particular location.  This includes information on the type, location of the barrier, date of 
implementation, plus any potential issues with the implementation, control or maintenance of the 
barrier. These details can be obtained through consultation with staff and visits to the location.  
Classification of the level of restriction was important in determining whether the fencing had 
been fitted in the way in which it had been intended.  In several cases the barrier did not work as 
had been intended (i.e. to protect against access to non-stopping trains).  One example of this is 
where the restricted access platform was available for public use because of engineering work.  It 
is assumed that no additional protective measures were used to prevent access to the main line 
when non-stopping trains were passing at this location.    Other examples of issues with the 
implementation and maintenance of the fencing include gaps in the continuity of the barrier, 
alternative routes to the restricted area (e.g. via an operational lift), leaving the gates open, or 
having poorly located station furniture which enables climbing of the fencing.   These 
demonstrate that without detailed planning, maintenance and operational procedures, a barrier 
may be ineffective. 
The study findings show that more information is needed in relation to a number of incidents, in 
order to fully understand how the person got access to the fast lines prior to the suicide event. 
Better information is needed on which platform was used for accessing the track area, whether 
people crossed railway lines, the status of the fencing and gates (e.g. open, closed), details of 
unusual circumstances and changes in station operation (e.g. due to engineering works).  It is 
acknowledged that in some cases little is known of the circumstances of the incident, but more 
could be done to collate and interpret information from various sources to try to form a clearer 
conclusion on the events leading up to an incident and how well prevention measures such as 
fencing performed in inhibiting access to the track area..  
Overall, the first indications from the evaluation study suggest that the fencing seems to be 
effective where it has been fitted as it was intended (i.e. to provide full restriction of access to fast 
lines).  However, in practice it has not always been possible to achieve this and there are 
examples of situations where fatalities have occurred where partial or (what was assumed to be) 
full mid-platform fencing was fitted.  More is needed at an operational level in the industry to be 
able to recognise when the intervention is not likely to be operating as it should be (either 
through issues relating to design or implementation on a day to day basis or in unusual 
circumstances).  Further statistical analysis is on-going to explore the impact of the fencing and 
the associated restriction of access on the numbers of incidents across the wider sample of 
stations.   
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